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Abstract 
It has long been supposed that the confirmation bias plays a role in the prevalence and maintenance 
of misconceptions. However, this has been supported more by argument than by empirical 
evidence. In the present paper, we show how different types of belief-feedback evoke physiological 
responses consistent with the presence of a confirmation bias. Participants were presented with 
misconceptions and indicated whether they believed each misconception to be true or false, as well 
as how committed they were to the misconception. Each response was followed by feedback that 
was either clear (i.e., “correct” or “incorrect”) or ambiguous (i.e., “partly correct” or “partly 
incorrect”). Pupillary response to each feedback condition was assessed. The results show an 
interaction between feedback accuracy and feedback clarity on pupil size. The largest pupil size was 
found in response to clear disconfirmatory feedback. The smallest pupil size was found in response 
to both clear and ambiguous confirmatory feedback. Crucially, the pupil responded to ambiguous 
confirmatory feedback as though it were wholly confirmatory. Moreover, pupil size in response to   
ambiguous disconfirmatory feedback was significantly smaller than response to clear 
disconfirmatory feedback, showing an overall trend towards confirmatory processing in the absence 
of clear disconfirmation. Additionally, we show a moderation by commitment towards the 
misconception. The greater the commitment, the larger the effect of belief-violating feedback on 
pupil size. These findings support recent theorizing in the field of misconceptions and, more 
generally, the field of inconsistency-compensation. 
Keywords: confirmation bias, pupillometry, misconceptions, error-feedback, inconsistency 
compensation  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Confirmation Bias and Misconceptions: Pupillometric Evidence for a Confirmation Bias in 
Misconceptions Feedback 
The confirmation bias is the tendency to search for, interpret, favor and recall information in 
a way that confirms one's preexisting beliefs or hypotheses. Various psychological tendencies can 
be considered illustrations of a confirmation bias. For instance, people may start out overconfident 
in an initial belief, fail to give proper consideration to alternative hypotheses, or interpret 
ambiguous information in favor of a held belief (Klayman, 1995). Moreover, the confirmation bias 
has been subject to much empirical work (for an overview, see Nickerson, 1998) and has been 
argued to impact societally important areas like policy making (Tuchman, 1984), medical care 
(Pines, 2006), false beliefs and the spread of misinformation (Hughes, Lyddy, & Lambe, 2013; 
Vicario et al., 2016), and even science itself (Kuhn, 1970; Polya, 1954).  
In the present paper, we investigate whether a confirmation bias process can be observed in 
people’s arousal response to belief-feedback. We investigate the possibility that confirmation biases 
may occur rapidly in the context of prevalent yet incorrect beliefs, i.e., misconceptions. 
Misconceptions and the confirmation bias 
People are often confronted with information that explicitly disconfirms their beliefs. 
Research has found that even in the presence of explicit negative feedback, people’s beliefs may 
persist (Nickerson, 1998). Rather than changing their minds, people frequently question or explain 
away information that conflicts with pre-existing beliefs (Henrion & Fischhoff, 1986; Lord, Ross, 
& Lepper, 1979). This is more likely to occur when the belief-violating information is ambiguous 
(Risinger, Saks, Thompson & Rosenthal, 2002; Ross & Anderson, 1982) and when commitment 
towards the prior belief is high (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001).  
One area in which such belief-persistence is particularly relevant is the area of 
misconceptions. Misconceptions refer to knowledge and beliefs that are incongruent with the core 
concepts and empirical findings of a discipline (Hamza & Wickman, 2008; Taylor & Kowalski, 
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2004). Common misconceptions include the belief that humans use 10% of their brain, that the 
expected life span during the Middle Ages was 30, or that Vikings wore horned helmets in battle. 
Although these beliefs are incorrect, they remain common; with prevalence rates ranging from 28% 
to 71% (Lillienfeld et al., 2009).  
Most of the research on misconceptions has been conducted in the field of educational 
psychology because of potential challenges that misconceptions pose for educators (Hughes, Lyddy, 
& Lambe, 2013). It has been speculated that misconceptions negatively impact the learning of new 
information (Chew, 2006; Hammer, 1996; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982), resulting in 
worse academic performance (Kendeou & van den Broek, 2005). Besides negative consequences in 
education, misconceptions may also harm individuals in various domains of their lives, including 
romantic relationships (e.g., by believing that “opposites attract”), medical decisions (e.g., by 
believing that vitamin C protects against the common cold) or seeking help from authorities (e.g., 
by believing you have to wait more than 24 hours to file a missing persons report; van Maanen, 
1994). 
Researchers have also investigated how misconceptions can be reduced. Unfortunately, they 
have found that misconceptions are highly resistant to change. Exposure to educational courses 
were found to reduce some misconceptions but fail to eliminate many others (Gregg, Winer, 
Cottrell, Hedman, & Fournier, 2001; Lamal, 1995; Landau & Bavaria, 2003). For example, 30% of 
students believe that someone experiencing schizophrenia has a “split personality” even after 
completing psychology courses that teach this belief is false (Gardner & Dalsing, 1986). To explain 
this failure to reduce misconceptions, researchers have pointed at cognitive biases such as the 
confirmation bias (Lilienfeld, Lynn, Ruscio, & Beyerstein, 2010; Schick & Vaughn, 2014). Yet, as 
noted by Hughes, Lyddy, and Lambe (2013) in their review on the topic, these suggestions are 
limited due to lack of empirical investigation and “have generally been more supported by 
argument rather than empirical evidence” (p. 22).  
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In the present paper, we investigate whether a confirmation bias may indeed underlie, in 
part, the persistence of misconceptions. We propose that one method to demonstrate the relevance 
of the confirmation bias is by assessing physiological responses to belief-feedback. There are two 
main reasons why a physiological measure may be preferred over more traditional measures such as 
self-report: 1) physiological measures can potentially index psychological processes that are not 
reflected in self-reports due to limitations resulting from social desirability or the lack of 
introspective awareness and 2) physiological measures allow for more sensitive measures such as 
greater temporal resolution compared to self-report (Tomarken, 1995). In the context of responding 
to belief-feedback, we believe that social desirability may be an important factor because there are 
often specific norms as to how people should respond to belief feedback. Additionally, a more 
sensitive measure also enables us to detect quick, preconscious responses to belief-feedback, which 
may reveal differences between various types of belief-feedback that can be obscured by self-report 
measures. 
Physiological responses to belief-violating feedback 
Although humans appear to frequently demonstrate a confirmation bias, they are not 
immune to belief feedback. After all, it is functional to have, to some degree, an accurate 
representation of one’s environment. Consequently, one of the main functions of the central nervous 
system is to constantly compare sensory input from the environment to expectations derived from 
one’s beliefs. Inconsistencies between sensory input and one’s expectations indicate a need for 
belief-updating. Various brain areas have been implicated in this monitoring function, such as the 
anterior cingulate cortex and the posterior parietal cortex (O’Reilly et al., 2013). Based on this 
research, it appears that people do not update their beliefs in a fully rational, Bayesian, manner, and 
often do so insufficiently, giving rise to the confirmation bias (Charness & Dave, 2017).  
The observation that people do not always rationally update their beliefs following negative 
belief-feedback lies at the core of recent models in the inconsistency-compensation literature (Jonas  
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et al., 2014; Proulx, Inzlicht & Harmon-Jones, 2012). According to these models, people construct 
mental models that enable them to predict and interpret subsequent experiences, providing them 
with a sense of understanding, even meaning (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012). For instance, people 
frequently maintain the mental model that the world is just (Lerner, 1980). They believe good things 
happen to good people and bad things to bad people. Mental models such as the belief in a just 
world are not held passively. Once adopted, people are committed to these models, as seen in the 
defensive behaviors following just world belief violating events such as natural disasters, accidents, 
and criminal acts that harm innocent people. Rather than changing their belief in a just world, 
people often blame the victim in order to maintain their just world belief (van den Bos & Maas, 
2009; van der Bruggen & Grubb, 2014).  
The motivation for people to maintain their beliefs is further demonstrated by studies 
showing that inconsistencies result in a state of physiological arousal. For example, the experience 
of cognitive dissonance elicits increased skin conductance responses (e.g., Croyle & Cooper, 1983). 
Similarly, interacting with stereotype-inconsistent individuals has been found to produce aversive 
arousal as assessed with impedance cardiography (Mendes, Blascovich, Hunter, Lickel, & Jost, 
2007; Townsend, Major, Sawyer, & Mendes, 2010). Even trivial perceptual inconsistencies such as 
reverse-colored playing cards produce sympathetic nervous system arousal, as assessed with 
pupillometry (Sleegers, Proulx, & van Beest, 2015). Consequently, it has been postulated that all 
experiences of inconsistency evoke a state of aversive arousal. The state of arousal in turn motivates 
compensatory behaviors aimed at reducing the aversive arousal, whether it is through a change in 
the belief or an alternative strategy (see Jonas et al., 2014; Proulx et al., 2012; Sleegers & Proulx, 
2015).  
Arousal and pupillometry 
One increasing popular measure of arousal is pupillometry. Pupillometry (i.e., measuring 
changes in pupil size) is a popular tool to assess neuroaffective arousal (for reviews, see Beatty & 
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Lucero-Wagoner, 2000; Sirois & Brisson, 2014). The relationship between pupil size and arousal 
stems from its association with the locus coeruleus-norepinephrine (LC-NE) system. This system 
plays a role in the regulation of engagement or withdrawal from a task by releasing NE through 
projections from the LC in the forebrain (for a review, see Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005). Research 
has shown that pupil size correlates with LC activity in monkeys (Rajkowski et al., 1993) as well as 
in humans (Gilzenrat, Nieuwenhuis, Jepma, & Cohen, 2010; Murphy, O’Connell, O’Sullivan, 
Robertson & Balsters, 2014), and work by Beatty and colleagues on the pupillary system is 
consistent with LC responses to task-events (Beatty, 1982a, b; Richer & Beatty, 1978; see Aston-
Jones & Cohen, 2005, for a discussion).  
The link between pupil size and the LC-NE system allows researchers to infer a broad range 
of both cognitive and emotional processes from the extent of pupil dilation. Notably, the pupil 
dilates in response to task error (Brown et al., 1999; Critchley, Tang, Glaser, Butterworth, & Dolan, 
2005) and violations of expectations (Preuschoff, ’t Hart & Einhäuser, 2011; Proulx, Sleegers & 
Tritt, 2017; Raisig, Welke, Hagendorf & van der Meer, 2010; Sleegers, Proulx & Van Beest, 2015). 
More specifically, Nassar et al. (2012) have shown that prediction error (i.e., unexpectedness) was 
positively correlated with pupil size and linked this response to each participant’s learning rate (i.e., 
belief-updating). They conclude that a relationship between arousal state and learning rate is likely 
a result of a coordinated learning-arousal network including the locus coeruleus and the ACC.  
We propose that pupillometry affords a physiological demonstration of the confirmation 
bias. As prior research has shown, when events violate people’s beliefs, this should result in pupil 
dilation and a potential display of the confirmation bias, particularly when the feedback is 
ambiguous. When feedback is ambiguous, it can be implicitly interpreted as either confirming or 
violating the expectations that follow from prior beliefs. Given that people are motivated to 
maintain their prior beliefs, we propose that people are particularly likely to assimilate ambiguous 
feedback in such a way that it wholly confirms their existing beliefs. Consequently, this assimilation 
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should affect physiological arousal levels following feedback. If feedback is assimilated as 
confirmatory, the feedback should not evoke elevated levels of arousal, while if feedback is 
interpreted as disconfirmatory, elevated levels of arousal should follow. Additionally, these effects 
should be more pronounced the more one is committed to the belief. If one is highly committed to a 
belief, one has a stronger expectation to be correct and should thus be more likely to interpret 
feedback as confirmatory feedback. 
Hypotheses 
Using a 2 (feedback accuracy: correct/incorrect) x 2 (feedback clarity: clear/ambiguous) x 1 
(commitment) design, we investigate the impact of clear and ambiguous feedback about 
misconceptions on the pupillary response, with an aim to gain empirical support for the role of a 
confirmation bias process. We hypothesize that when participants receive feedback about the 
veracity of their beliefs, they will show an increase in pupil dilation when the feedback is belief-
violating (i.e., “incorrect”) relative to when the feedback is confirmatory (i.e., “correct”). More 
importantly, and indicative of a confirmation bias, we hypothesize that ambiguous feedback (i.e., 
“partly correct” and “partly incorrect”) will be assimilated as a confirmation of existing beliefs, thus 
evoking a pupillary response that is similar to the pupillary response following wholly confirmatory 
feedback (i.e., “correct”), and distinct from wholly disconfirmatory (i.e., incorrect). Finally, we 
hypothesize that relative commitment to the misconception will moderate the pupillary response, 
heightening both the increased (disconfirmation) and decreased (confirmation) arousal that 
corresponds to belief veracity feedback.  
Note that we opted for manipulating the ambiguity of both the confirming and disconfirming 
feedback, rather than employing a design with only one type of ambiguity. Semantically, the two 
ambiguous options should be processed identically, but framing effects have been shown to be 
prevalent (e.g., Schwarz, 1999), hence we decided to include both options and test the exploratory 
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hypothesis that positive ambiguity is more likely to be processed as whole confirmatory feedback 
than negative ambiguity. 
Method 
Participants 
We recruited a total of 51 undergraduate psychology students from Tilburg University who 
took part for course credit. They had an average age of 19.65 (SD = 1.84, min = 17, max = 24; 2 
missing) and the majority of the participants were women (82.35%). Sample size was based on 
prior research  (e.g., Bradley, Micolli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008; Laeng, Ørbo, Holmlund, & Miozzo, 1
2011, Partala & Surakka, 2003) and data was collected over the course of one week of reserved lab 
time. No additional data was collected after data analysis commenced. 
Procedure and Design 
Participants were welcomed into the lab and seated in standardized cubicles. The eye tracker 
was calibrated using the calibration extension from E-Prime 2 (Psychology Software Tools, 
Pittsburgh, PA). Hereafter, the misconceptions task began. 
We employed a 2 x 2 x 1 within-subjects design to test the effect of feedback accuracy 
(correct/incorrect), feedback ambiguity (clear/ambiguous) and misconception commitment on 
pupillary reactivity. Participants were presented with misconceptions and asked to indicate whether 
they believed the misconception to be true or false. Following each misconception, but before they 
received the feedback, participants were asked several questions to assess their commitment 
towards the misconception. At the end, we assessed demographics, debriefed, and thanked 
participants for their participation. 
 In the present paper we analyzed our results using linear mixed models. Calculating power for these types of analyses 1
is challenging and unsupported in popular power calculation tools (e.g., G*Power), hence we based our sample size on 
previous studies in the literature.
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Figure 1: Overview of a single trial. Durations are presented below each screen. Note that 
participants received three commitment questions, one by one, with no response window. 
Materials 
Task. The task contained 100 trials. Trials began with a fixation cross (Courier New, 30pt, 
black) that was displayed for 1000 ms on a gray background, followed by a misconception (Arial, 
18pt, black). Participants could press the ‘1’ key to indicate that the misconception is correct or ‘2’ 
for incorrect, with a response window of 10 s. Next, participants answered three commitment 
questions about the misconception. Hereafter the words "Your answer is..." appeared. When the 
participant fixated on the words for 1000 ms, the words disappeared and the feedback appeared. 
The feedback was either clearly confirming (“correct”), clearly disconfirming (“incorrect”), 
ambiguously confirming (“partly correct”), or ambiguously disconfirming (“partly incorrect”). 
Participants received each feedback type equally often, so the feedback was not tied to their actual 
response. The four feedback options were presented in random order. The feedback was presented 
in Arial, 18pt, black font, in the center of the screen for a duration of 1500 ms. For an overview of a 
trial, see Figure 1.  
 Misconceptions. Misconceptions were collected from various sources, such as the Internet 
and books on the topic (e.g., Lilienfeld et al., 2010; van Maanen, 1994). A list of the misconceptions 
is available in Appendix A. 
Commitment. To assess commitment, we asked three questions about each misconception: 
"How certain are you of your answer?", "How important is the statement to you?", and “How much 
+ People use 10% of 
their brain. 
How certain are you of 
your answer? 
How important is the 
statement to you? 
How much fun do you 
think the statement is?
Your answer is…
1000 ms
10 s (max)
1000 ms (min)
1500 ms
Correct 
Partly correct 
Partly incorrect 
Incorrect
3x
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fun do you think the statement is?”. We included the question on fun because many of the 
misconceptions are often referred to a fun facts, indicating that while some misconceptions may be 
trivial, people may derive value from the misconceptions in terms of enjoyment. The 
misconceptions were referred to as statements (“stelling” in Dutch), in order to prevent the 
participants from realizing all statements were misconceptions. Each question consisted of a Likert 
scale that ranged from 1 ("Not at all") to 7 ("Completely"). The commitment measure was created 
by averaging the responses on the certainty, importance, and fun measure together. Cronbach's α 
was calculated for each of the 100 misconceptions and was found to be acceptable (M = 0.68, SD = 
0.11). 
Pupillometry. Pupil data was collected using a Tobii T60 eye tracker (Tobii, Stockholm, 
Sweden). The Tobii T60 is integrated in a 17” TFT monitor and records at a rate of 60Hz. Each 
measurement has a validity indication that ranges from 0 (the system is certain that all data belongs 
to the particular eye) to 4 (gaze data is missing or incorrect). Only recordings with a validity score 
of 0 were used, resulting in 16.6% missing data during the relevant pupil response period (500-1500 
ms). Pupil size from each eye were averaged together to create a single pupil size score. To address 
missing data, pupil measures were linearly interpolated using the “zoo” package (Zeileis & 
Grothendieck) and filtered with a modified repeated median filter (outer width: 25, inner width 15) 
using the “robfilter” package (Fried, Schettlinger, & Borowski, 2014). Hereafter, the pupil size was 
controlled for baseline differences by subtracting the average pupil size during a 500 ms fixation 
period before feedback presentation from the subsequent pupil measurements during feedback 
presentation (Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000). A 500 ms period after feedback presentation served 
as the light reflex period. Finally, an average pupil size was calculated over the 500-1500 ms time 
feedback period, resulting in an average pupil size change score for each trial. 
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Data analysis 
Data was analyzed using R (R Core Team, 2018). All analyses consisted of linear multilevel 
models, using both a frequentist and Bayesian framework. For the frequentist analyses, the 'lme4' 
package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) was used in combination with 
‘lmerTest’ (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017), which adds p-values and degrees of 
freedom for the t-test on the model parameters. For the Bayesian analyses, we used the ‘brms’ 
package (Bürkner, 2017). We defined random intercepts for each participant and each 
misconception in our models. Feedback accuracy (0 = correct; 1 = incorrect) and feedback 
ambiguity (0 = clear; 1 = ambiguous) were dummy coded and added as categorical predictors. 
Commitment was added as a (mean centered) covariate. Effects were inspected using additional 
contrast coding (e.g., changing the reference category). In the case of an interaction with 
commitment, both simple slopes were analyzed and the effect of feedback at both the minimum and 
maximum level of commitment. For the Bayesian analyses, we set normal distribution priors on the 
regression coefficients (µ = 0, σ = 1). With a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 we regularize 
the prior and allow enough variation for the data to inform the posterior. 
Results 
Response descriptives 
Participants believed, on average, that the majority of the misconceptions were true (M = 
67.86%, SD = 8.86), despite all misconceptions being factually untrue. This indicates that 1) 
people’s beliefs were indeed misconceptions and 2) participants did not realize all statements were 
misconceptions and consequently did not adopt the response style of simply stating each statement 
was false. 
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Main analyses 
Frequentist analyses. We conducted a linear mixed model with feedback accuracy (correct/
incorrect), feedback ambiguity (clear/ambiguous), commitment (mean centered), and their 
interactions as predictors. We found a significant main effect of feedback accuracy, t(4981.72) = 
7.21, p < .001 b = 0.034, SE = 0.0047, 95% CI [0.025, 0.043]. Given our dummy coding, this main 
effect indicates that participants showed a larger pupil dilation following clear belief violating 
feedback than after clear belief confirming feedback (also see Table 1). There was no main effect of 
feedback clarity, t(4979.96) = 0.38, p = .70, b = 0.0018, SE = 0.0047, 95% CI [-0.0082, 0.011]. 
Importantly, there was a significant interaction effect between feedback clarity and feedback 
accuracy, t(4980.59) = -2.46, p = .014, b = -0.016, SE = 0.0067, 95% CI [-0.030, -0.0035]. As can 
be seen in Figure 2, participants did not differ in the amount of pupil dilation following either clear 
confirming feedback and ambiguous correct feedback, while ambiguous violating feedback resulted 
in greater pupil dilation compared to ambiguous confirming feedback, t(4982.24) = 3.73, p <. 001, 
b = 0.018, SE = 0.0047, 95% CI [0.0077, 0.027], and clear confirming feedback, t(4984.98) = 4.12, 
p <. 001, b = 0.020, SE = 0.0047, 95% CI [0.0096, 0.029]. Additionally, we find that when the 
feedback violated people’s beliefs, there was less pupil dilation following ambiguous violating 
feedback than after clear violating feedback, t(4984.77) = -3.09, p = 0.002, b = -0.015, SE = 0.0047, 
95% CI [-0.024, -0.0042].  
Table 1: Descriptives of average pupil size change in response to each feedback condition.
Feedback Clarity M SD SE Min max
correct clear 0.053 0.057 0.0080 -0.076 0.16
correct ambiguous 0.054 0.053 0.0075 -0.056 0.18
incorrect clear 0.087 0.071 0.010 -0.074 0.31
incorrect ambiguous 0.072 0.058 0.0082 -0.050 0.24
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Figure 2: Average pupil dilation in response to feedback accuracy (correct/incorrect) and 
feedback clarity (clear/ambiguous), with commitment as a covariate. Error bars reflect 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
There was a significant main effect of commitment, t(4725.27) = -3.02, p = .0026, b = -0.0092, SE 
= 0.0030, 95% CI [-0.015, -0.0025] and a significant interaction effect of commitment and feedback 
accuracy, t(4988.67) = 3.68, p < .001, b = 0.016, SE = 0.0043, 95% CI [0.0066, 0.0025], see Figure 
3. The main effect indicates that when participants received clear confirming feedback, higher 
levels of commitment were associated with less pupil dilation. Additionally, we find that when 
participants received clearly violating feedback, higher levels of commitment was associated with 
more pupil dilation, t(4704.92) = 2.20, p = .028, b = 0.0067, SE = 0.0030, 95% CI [0.00061, 0.013].  
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Figure 3: Average pupil dilation in response to positive and negative feedback as a function of 
commitment. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. 
We inspected the effect of clear feedback accuracy at varying levels of commitment. At the 
lowest level of commitment, there was no effect of feedback accuracy, t(4987.21) = 0.74, p = 0.46, 
b = 0.0079, SE = 0.011, 95% CI [-0.015, 0.028] while at the highest level there was an effect of 
feedback accuracy, t(4987.11) = 5.36, p < .001, b = 0.066, SE = 0.012, 95% CI [0.040, 0.092]. 
Finally, we did not find an interaction effect of commitment and feedback ambiguity, t(4988.08) = 
0.79, p = .43, b = 0.0035, SE = 0.0044, 95% CI [-0.0053, 0.012], nor a three-way interaction effect, 
t(4988.96) = -0.88, p = .38, b = -0.0054, SE = 0.0062, 95% CI [-0.018, 0.0066].  2
 We also repeated our main analysis without commitment as a covariate and found the same significant main effect of 2
feedback accuracy, t(4985.59) = 7.17, p < .001, b = 0.034, SE = 0.0047, 95% CI [0.024, 0.044], nonsignificant effect of 
feedback ambiguity, t(4983.95) = 0.30, p = .76, b = 0.0014, SE = 0.0047, 95% CI [-0.0073, 0.0098], and significant 
interaction effect, t(4984.92) = -2.42, p = .015, b = -0.016, SE = 0.0067, 95% CI [-0.029, -0.0024].
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Figure 4: Predicted fitted values of the Bayesian model. Results show the credible pupillary 
responses for each feedback type, with commitment as a covariate. Larger density values indicate 
more plausible values. 
Bayesian analyses. The previous analyses were repeated using a Bayesian framework. 
Consistent with the frequentist analyses, we find that participants showed a larger pupil dilation 
following belief violating feedback than after belief confirming feedback, b = 0.034, SE = 0.0048, 
95% HDI [0.025, 0.043]. Similarly, results indicate no main effect of feedback clarity, as shown by 
a small effect and the 95% HDI overlapping with 0, b = 0.0017, SE = 0.0048, 95% HDI [-0.0077, 
0.011].  
The previously found interaction effect is also supported by the Bayesian analysis, b = 
-0.016, SE = 0.0069, 95% HDI [-0.030, -0.0032]. For an overview of these results, see Figure 4. 
Notably, these finding reiterate the results of the frequentist analyses, but importantly increase 
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confidence that the pupillary response to partly correct feedback matches the pupillary response to 
wholly correct feedback—a conclusion that is more difficult to draw using the frequentist 
framework.  
 We similarly find that commitment affects the pupillary response following confirmatory 
feedback, b = -0.0092, SE = 0.0030, 95% HDI [-0.015, -0.0033] and that commitment interacts with 
feedback accuracy, b = 0.016, SE = 0.0042, 95% HDI [0.0076, 0.024] in a manner consistent with 
the frequentist analyses. Also consistent with the frequentist analysis, we do not find support for a 
three-way interaction between commitment, feedback accuracy, and feedback ambiguity, b = 
-0.0054, SE = 0.0060, 95% HDI [-0.017, 0.0063]. 
Discussion 
We conducted an experiment to investigate the physiological response to feedback about 
held misconceptions. By observing and manipulating both the accuracy and clarity of the feedback 
we demonstrated that feedback disconfirming beliefs (i.e., being mistaken) led to an increase in 
pupil size compared to feedback confirming beliefs (i.e., being correct). Crucially, when feedback 
was confirmatory but ambiguous (“partly correct”), the amount of pupil dilation was identical to 
that in response to wholly confirmatory feedback (“correct”). Moreover, when feedback was belief-
violating but ambiguous (“partly incorrect”), this led to less pupil dilation compared to wholly 
violating feedback (“incorrect”), showing at overall trend towards confirmatory processing in the 
absence of clear disconfirmation. 
Also, we found that the amount of arousal was moderated by commitment towards the 
misconception belief. At low levels of commitment, we found no effect of feedback on arousal, but 
at higher levels of commitment there was an increasingly larger difference in arousal between 
confirming and disconfirming feedback. At high commitment, disconfirmatory feedback violates 
valued expectations, resulting in more arousal. At low commitment, the absence of expectations 
about the veracity of the misconception excludes a violation of expectations, resulting in a reduced, 
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if not absent, arousal response. Additionally, confirmatory feedback was associated with less 
arousal at increasing levels of commitment, to the extent that committed expectations were being 
confirmed. When the feedback was disconfirmatory, greater commitment was associated with 
higher levels of arousal. Notably, we did not find support for a three-way interaction. This means 
we did not find empirical evidence for the possibility that a confirmation bias is more likely when 
commitment towards the misconception is high. 
Theoretical implications 
Confirmation bias is a ubiquitous phenomenon, with many studies demonstrating this 
behavior, but there have not been any empirical investigations of a confirmation bias in response to 
misconceptions, despite their presupposed relevance (Hughes, Lyddy, & Lambe, 2013). Our study 
contributes to this literature by demonstrating a confirmation bias in response to feedback about 
misconceptions, as assessed with a direct psychophysiological measure. It appears that people 
interpret ambiguous feedback about their misconceptions in a manner consistent with clear belief-
confirming feedback when the feedback is positively framed, and less so when the ambiguous 
feedback is negatively framed. 
Our results provide additional support for inconsistency-compensation models (Jonas et al., 
2014; Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012). According to these models, people experience a 
state of aversive arousal following the detection of inconsistencies, such as those following negative 
belief-feedback. Numerous studies have shown that inconsistencies cause a state of aversive arousal 
and that they are motivated to reduce this arousal (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012; Sleegers & Proulx, 
2015). The results of the present study show that participants show increased arousal in response to 
negative belief-feedback, and predictably show a reduced response when provided with ambiguous 
belief-feedback. These findings provide new avenues for future research. For example, the absence 
of an arousal response following positively framed ambiguous feedback should make subsequent 
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compensation behaviors, such as belief-updating, unnecessary—a prediction that can be tested in 
future studies. 
 We found no effect of feedback ambiguity when the feedback was confirmatory, but when 
the ambiguous feedback was belief disconfirmatory, the feedback did result in greater pupil dilation 
relative to clear or ambiguous confirmatory feedback. This finding may be consistent with a 
negativity bias, the notion that negative stimuli have a greater effect on one's psychological state 
and processes than do neutral or positive stimuli. Myriad studies have demonstrated this bias (for 
reviews, see Baumeister et al., 2001; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999; Peeters & Czapinski, 
1990; Taylor, 1991). However, negativity bias fails to account for the general pattern of effects, 
insofar as ambiguous confirmatory feedback—which is partially disconfirmatory—did not produce 
the same magnitude of pupillary response as wholly disconfirmatory feedback. Moreover, 
ambiguous disconfirmatory feedback produced significantly less pupillary response than wholly 
disconfirmatory feedback, which could not have occurred if negativity were the dominant 
assimilation bias underlying feedback processing. Instead, a dominant negativity bias would have 
produced a pattern of effects whereby both ambiguous feedback responses would have significantly 
differed from the wholly confirmatory feedback, the converse of what we report. The fact that any 
feedback not wholly disconfirmatory produces relatively diminished pupillary response suggests a 
relatively dominant role for confirmation bias in belief-feedback. 
Limitation 
In the current study we used a 2 x 2 design to test the effect of feedback accuracy and 
feedback clarity. The consequence is that this introduced two versions of ambiguous feedback: 
partly correct, partly incorrect. The advantage of this design is that it allowed us to test whether 
both forms of ambiguity are equally likely to be assimilated. A potential limitation, however, is that 
we inadvertently may have made the ambiguous feedback less ambiguous by including the words 
’correct’ and ’incorrect’ in the ambiguous feedback. This suggests that it may be possible to vary the 
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severity of ambiguity, and thus vary the impact of ambiguity on arousal. In fact, Holroyd, Hajcak, 
and Larsen (2006) demonstrated that wholly ambiguous feedback (non-informative performance 
feedback vs. positive or negative performance feedback) elicited heightened feedback error-related 
negativity to the same extent as negative feedback. Similarly, Hirsh and Inzlicht (2008) revealed 
individual differences in response to ambiguous performance feedback (a question mark vs. positive 
(+) or negative (-) feedback), with some individuals reacting more strongly to uncertain feedback 
than negative feedback (see also Gu, Ge, Huang, & Luo, 2010). Although beyond the scope of the 
present research, we suggest that these differences in findings could be due to variations in the level 
of ambiguity. Future research could investigate whether the level of ambiguity also affects whether 
people are more or less likely to display a confirmation bias. Our findings show that people may be 
more likely to display the confirmation bias when the ambiguous feedback contains positive 
framing. 
Although pupillometry is a widely used technique to assess physiological arousal (e.g., see 
Beatty & Lucero-Wagner, 2000; Laeng, Sirois, & Gredebäck; 2011; Sirois & Brisson; 2014), it is 
limited in important ways. For instance, pupillometry cannot be used to assess whether the 
experienced arousal is aversive. Research has shown that pupil dilation occurs following both 
positive and negative stimuli (Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig & Lang, 2008). Hence, it cannot be 
concluded that participants felt bad after certain types of belief-feedback. In fact, the valence of 
inconsistencies remains a debated topic (see e.g., Kruglanski et al. 2018). 
An additional limitation of pupillometry is that it may not be clear what exact psychological 
process is being assessed in reaction to the stimuli. Pupil responses have been linked to several 
psychological processes implicated in the LC-NE system, such as cognitive load, interest value, and 
emotional content (Sirois & Brisson, 2014). Based on pupil size alone, it cannot be ascertained what 
exact psychological process was responsible for the changes in pupil size. Nevertheless, the pattern 
of pupillary reactivity suggest that this process reacted to ambiguous stimuli as though it were 
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wholly or partially assimilated as confirmatory. In the present study, we assume that this pattern of 
reactivity required implicit interpretation of the feedback. Future research may specify which of 
these processes we are assessing with our pupillary measure, using different psychophysiological 
assessments.     
Finally, we present only one study in support of a confirmation bias process underlying 
misconception feedback. Future work should aim to replicate the our findings and extend our work, 
for example by testing whether the reduced pupillary responses are also associated with less belief-
updating and whether the arousal induced by negative belief-feedback is indeed experienced as 
aversive. 
Conclusion 
We presented participants with feedback about their misconceptions and observed that 
feedback violating beliefs elicits more physiological arousal, as measured through pupil dilation, 
than feedback confirming beliefs. We found evidence for a confirmation bias. Ambiguous 
confirmatory feedback was assimilated as wholly confirmatory feedback, while ambiguously belief-
violating feedback appeared to be partially assimilated as confirmatory. This response was 
moderated by a commitment towards the misconception—no effect of feedback was found at the 
lowest levels of commitment and the largest effect of feedback was found at the highest levels of 
commitment. With this data we have empirical support for the role of a confirmation bias in 
response to feedback about misconceptions. 
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